From this force, garrisons must be found for Baltimore and Washington, troops to guard the upper and lower Potomac, the railways to the Capital, and so forth. McClellan says[1] that in his judgment, 30,000 men is a moderate estimate of the force to be left in and about Washington, that 10,000 should be placed in and about Baltimore, and that 5000 were needed to guard the lower, and 15,000 the tipper Potomac, — that is, that 60,000 men in all, HliouUl be assigned to guarding the frontier and the communications. This leaves only 41,000 for the active army.

McClellan's estimates of the number of men required for garrison and guard duty may be somewhat excessive, but any consideration of the subject will show that they could not be very much reduced. Only nix months before the date of this estimate, Baltimore had been in open rebellion, and the State of Maryland had refused to allow Massachusetts regiments to pass over her soil to go to the defence of the Capital.

But we are not concerned to make out that the figures given above are precisely accurate. We simply wish to call attention to the fact that very considerable deductions must be made under all these heads from the figures officially reported as showing the strength of the army at different dates.

la the next place, we should inquire in what state

whole number " present for duty," as being on extra duty. See McClellan's O, 8,, 75, 76. For a similar estimate of Confederate returns, see *Jackson** *V&lley Campaign,* by Colonel Allan, p. 92, n. i McCIelton's O. S., 77.